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Abstract 
Accidental loads constitute the great majority of potential and actual fatalities in offshore drilling 
operations. An unplanned HSE (Health, Safety, and Environment) event has a great potential to 
cause permanent disablement or death to onboard personnel. Therefore, it is highly desirable to 
minimize or prevent the accidental incidents rather than risking an unexpected event. Among all 
types of accidental collisions, dropped objects can pose the highest risks to the personnel, 
equipment, and structures on an offshore platform. Other types of accidental collisions, such as 
ship impact, helicopter collisions etc., can also endanger the safety of offshore platforms, 
however, these scenarios are often underreported. In order to prevent human loss and for a safe 
design of an offshore platform, the risks of these accidental collisions should be quantified, in 
terms of probability/frequency and consequence aspects. The risk assessment quantifies the risk 
caused by accidental collisions including dropped objects on potential targets from topsides to 
seabed, helicopter transport risk for inflight crash and for take-off/landing crash on the platform, 
and a passing vessel collision based on influence factors for severe structural damage and loss of 
hydrocarbon.  
This paper addresses the human and asset risk assessments against accidental collisions including 
dropped objects, helicopter collision, and ship impact in offshore operations. A new perspective 
on safe design of offshore structures for accidental collisions is outlined to estimate the 
associated risk to potential targets such as human personnel as well as platform decks, helidecks, 
jacket legs, risers, electrical cables, and pipelines. The frequencies and consequences of each 
modelled event are estimated to measure the overall risk to life in terms of IRPA (Individual 
Risk Per Annum), PLL (Potential Loss of Life), and WEV (Weighted Expectation Value). A risk 
matrix is utilized in mitigation decision as high impact frequency and high consequential events 
require mitigation strategies. The proposed assessment methodology will contribute towards 
identifying the mitigation measures and safety-critical procedures and equipment. 
 
Nomenclature  
DO    Dropped Object 
DOA    Dropped Object Analysis 
DNV    Det Norske Veritas 
FE    Finite Element 
FEA    Finite Element Analysis 
HSE    Health, Safety, and Environment 
IR    Individual Risk 
IRPA     Individual Risk Per Annum  
OGP    Oil & Gas Producers 
PLL     Potential Loss of Life 
POB    Personnel On Board 
TLP    Tension Leg Platform 
TO/L    Take-off & Landing 
WEV     Weighted Expectation Value 
WOAD   Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank 
 
1. Introduction 
In offshore drilling operations, the three main types of accidental collisions include dropped 
objects, helicopter collision, and ship impact. Among the three, the dropped objects are the 
highest threat and have constituted the great majority of potential and actual fatalities in offshore 
drilling operations. According to Ref. (1), overall dropped objects account for approximately 
60% of high potential incidents. As an example, a 10 lbs object dropped from 10 ft can 
potentially cause fatality. Statistics indicate that 50% of dropped object incidents occur above 
platform deck and wellhead, where the fatality risk is high.  Tubular, overhead equipment, and 
tubular handling equipment items have accounted for the majority of the dropped object 
categories. The consequences of dropped object may include but not limited to human fatalities / 
injuries, offshore asset damage / failure, and environment / reputation and business impact.  The 
objective of a dropped object assessment is to minimize the risk associated with the 
consequences listed above. 
 
Although having less frequency of occurrence, a helicopter collision is directly related to 
potential loss of life of personnel on the helicopter and on the asset that the helicopter collides 
with.  The associated consequences are always high because of the likelihood of human fatalities. 
For helicopter transportation, risk is presented in terms of IRPA and PLL using fatal accident 
rate per flight stage (one take off, one landing and single journey to or from the platform).  A 
 
good reference for the frequency of fatal helicopter accidents and deaths per fatal accident is the 
OGP Aviation transport accident statistics Report No. 434-11.1 (2). 
Ship collisions may be caused by either passing vessels or field related traffic.  According to the 
OGP Ship/Installation Collisions Report No.434-16 (3), passing vessels are ship traffic which is 
not related to the installation being considered, including merchant vessels, fishing vessels, naval 
vessels and also offshore related traffic going to and from other installations than that being 
considered. For passing vessels, collision risk is highly location dependent due to variation in 
ship traffic from one location to another. Field related offshore traffic refers to those vessels 
which are specifically visiting the installation, and is therefore considered to be less dependent of 
the location of the installation. The frequency of infield vessel impacts will depend on the 
durations that vessels are alongside, the installation layout, environmental conditions, and 
procedures. 
Risk assessment of accidental collisions involves two aspects: the probability/frequency analysis 
and consequence analysis. The frequency and consequences of an event are used against a risk 
matrix to assess the risk level associated with the event. High frequency and high consequence 
events require mitigation strategies. For example, to mitigate the consequence of dropped object 
to a topside methanol tank, a protection structure may be required and must be designed to 
sufficiently absorb the impact energy from the dropped object. 
2. Methodology 
A safe design of offshore exploration and production facilities for accidental collisions requires 
the risk assessment of such events. Like any other risk assessments, the accidental collision 
assessment evaluates both the frequency of the risk (likelihood of the event) and the consequence 
of the event (human fatalities, structural integrity of the platform, impacts on environment, 
company reputation, and business). The following sections will discuss our approach for the 
frequency and consequence analyses for the risk assessment associated with dropped objects, 
helicopter collision, and ship impact. 
2.1 Frequency Analysis 
Dropped Objects 
There are often three types of dropped object analyses categorized based on the locations and 
targets of the drop.  These include Topsides DOA, Substructure DOA, and Subsea DOA, as 
illustrated in Figure 2-1. Topsides DOA generally covers the topsides of the platform, i.e., main 
and production decks of a platform or vessel decks. The targets include deck structural members 
(primary and secondary steel, deck plates), topsides equipment (e.g., fire water pump, diesel 
generators, etc.), laydown areas, stair towers, etc. Substructure DOA generally covers the 
components below topsides to above seafloor. The targets include top of TLP columns, 
pontoons, tendons, export risers/cables, jacket legs (fixed platforms), etc. Subsea DOA covers 
the architecture on the seafloor. Its targets include subsea pipelines, subsea cables, subsea 
architecture, and equipment such as wellheads. 
 
Figure 2-1: Three Types of Dropped Object Analysis (DOA).   
In this paper the approach for dropped object frequency analysis is based on an extension of the 
approach outlined in DNV-RP-F107 (4). This approach uses a two-stage Monte Carlo simulation 
technique to estimate impact probability at different levels from the main deck to the seafloor. 
The frequency of impact due to each dropped object is calculated by adding drop frequency and 
number of lifts per year to the impact probability. The cumulative impact frequency for each 
target is estimated by summing the values over the areas occupied by the target, i.e., taking 
integral. Impact energy at any level can be calculated based on the velocity at that level which 
can be linearly interpolated from the surface impact velocity and terminal velocity. The sea 
surface impact velocity is equal to square root of 2 times the product of the drop height and the 
gravitational acceleration. The terminal velocity is the velocity attainable by an object as it falls 
through the water column. It occurs once the sum of the drag force and buoyancy equals the 
downward force of gravity acting on the object. 
The two-stage Monte Carlo simulation method is illustrated in Figure 2-2. The first stage occurs 
on the sea surface (or on the main deck if desired). In the first stage, a random variable pair (R1, 
θ1) based on the drop point distance and angle with respect to the crane position are used. Crane 
extension, R1, is sampled from normal distribution, constrained by crane minimum and 
maximum radii. Crane rotation, θ1, is sampled from uniform distribution, constrained by crane 
lifting arc as seen in Figure 2-3. The second stage can occur at any level Z from the sea surface 
to the seabed. Similarly, in the second stage, a normal probability distribution of the impact point 
on level Z that is centered at the drop point on the sea surface is used. The point of impact at the 
level Z is sampled using a normal distribution of the extension R2 based on DNV-RP-F107 
approach and a uniform distribution for the rotation angle θ2 (0-360 degrees). The parameters, 
for example the angular deviation, for the normal distribution of the extension radius are based 
on water depth, weight, and shape of dropped objects. Dropped object angular deviations as 
recommended by DNV-RP-F107 and used for calculating the dropped object lateral excursion 
are summarized in Table 2-1. The definition of the angular deviation is shown in Figure 2-4. 
Figure 2-5 shows the illustration of discretization of impact area on seabed (or any level Z) into 
1mx1m cells. 1,000,000 drops were simulated for each dropped object at different levels along 
 
water depth. Impact probability in each 1mx1m cell was calculated as the number of hits in the 
cell divided by the total number of hits (1,000,000). Impact frequency per unit area per year is 
then equal to the impact probability multiplied with drop frequency and number of lifts per year 
and adjusted for cell size and dropped object size (see equations below Figure 2-5). 
 
Figure 2-2: Two-Stage Monte Carlo Simulations.   
 
Figure 2-3: Normal and Uniform Distributions for R1 and θ1. 
 




Angular deviation  
(α) (Deg.) 
Flat/long shaped 
< 2 15 
2 – 8 9 
> 8 5 
Box/round shaped < 2 10 
2 – 8 5 
> 8 3 
Box/round shaped >> 8 2 
 
Figure 2-4: Angular Deviation Definition (4) 
 









where: ADO = Dropped object impact area;  ACell = Unit cell area 
In the equations above, the drop frequency is often based on industry guidelines or standard such 
as DNV-RP-F107 or OGP Report 434-8 (5). For example, lifts performed using the drilling 
derrick are assumed to fall only in the sea, and with a dropped loads frequency as for ordinary 
lifts with the platform cranes, i.e., 2.2E-05 per lift (4). 
Helicopter Collision 
The frequency analysis of a helicopter collision assessment can be carried out based on the OGP 
 
Aviation transport accident statistics Report No. 434-11.1 (2). The analysis assesses the 
frequency associated with helicopter crash during transit, take-offs, and landing and helicopter 
impact on the platform after falling off from the helideck. The analysis is performed 
deterministically by considering the frequency of fatal helicopter accidents and fatalities, 
helicopter risk parameters from operation and transportation per trip and probability of impact.  
The overall approach for conducting the helicopter crash risk assessment involves the following 
steps: (1) describe study basis, (2) review operating procedures, (3) determine frequency, (4) 
assess individual risk, and (5) calculate potential loss of life.   
Step 1: Study Basis 
In the describing study basis step, the location of the asset is an important parameter. The 
following information forms the basis for the helicopter crash risk analysis: 
- Location of the platform and the shore base with respect to established flight paths, 
helicopter approaches, and distance 
- Number of flights per annum 
- Number of stages per flight 
- Helicopter passengers per flight 
- Number of take-off and landings per annum 
- Number of flight hours per annum 
Step 2: Operating Procedures Review 
In the reviewing operating procedures, information on aircraft flying to and from the asset such 
as emergency landing speed, number of operational personnel on the platform will be collected.  
Step 3: Frequency Determination 
The frequency of fatal helicopter accidents and deaths per fatal accident are determined based on 
the OGP Aviation transport accident statistics Report No. 434-11.1. Risks of helicopter 
transportation are presented as well in term of in-fight and take-offs/ landing. Relevant accident 
statistics from OGP are shown in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2 – Helicopter Accident Data based on OGP Report No. 434-11.1 (2) 
Flight Accident Data Value 
Risk per hour in flight  8.5 x 10-6 per flight hour 
Risk per take-off & landing 2.7 x 10-6 per flight stage 
Probability of fatal accident – in flight 0.74 
Probability of fatal accident – take-off & landing 0.24 
Probability of death in a fatal accident – in flight 0.87 
Probability of death in a fatal accident – take-off & landing 0.49 
 
Step 4: Individual Risk Assessment 
Individual risk is calculated on the basis of the equations below and the parameters given in 
Table 2-2.  The individual risk is the chance of an individual becoming a fatality and the 
potential loss of life is the individual risk for the aggregate platform operations personnel 
exposed to the collision. The following model is proposed in Ref. (2): 
IRPA = In-flight IR + Take-off & landing (TO/L) IR 
In-flight IR = Accident frequency in-flight (per hour) × 
Flight time (hours) × 
Probability of fatal accident × 
Probability of death in fatal accident 
TO/L IR = Accident frequency in TO/ L (per flight stage) × 
No. of flight stages per journey × 
Probability of fatal accident × 
Probability of death in fatal accident 
Step 5: Potential Loss of Life Calculation 
Helicopter PLL is calculated to represent the individual risk for the aggregate platform 
operations personnel exposed to helicopter transportation between the shore base and platform 
across the project life. PLL can be used to evaluate and compare between options of helicopter 
risk reduction measures.  
PLL = IRPA × Number of crew × flights/crew × passengers/flight 
 
Ship Impact 
If the marine traffic information around the platform being considered is not available, the ship 
traffic data of field related offshore traffic can be taken from the OGP statistical accident data 
(3).  
The overall approach for conducting the ship collision frequency analysis involves the following 
steps: (1) Overview of historical ship/installation collision information, (2) Field related traffic 
vessels review, (3) Damage level of ship collision, (4) Collision frequency, (5) Probability of 
ship collision, (6) Individual risk calculation, and (7) Potential loss of life calculation. 
Step 1: Overview of historical ship/installation collision information 
Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) provides collision incidents worldwide during 
1980-1989 and 1990-2002. Number of collisions and number of exposures from infield vessels 
colliding the platform have been estimated using WOAD data and are provided in Table 2-3. 
Ship collision frequency can be calculated from the ratio of number of collisions to the number 
of exposures. From Table 2-3, it is seen that the number of infield vessel collisions have 
considerably reduced from the 1980 – 1989 period to the 1990 – 2002.  
Table 2-3 – Worldwide Collision Data of Infield Vessels during 1980-1989 and 1990-
2002 (3) 
Parameter During 1980-1989 During 1990-2002 
 
Number of collision 103 86 
Number of exposure 56243 97627 
Collision frequency 1.8 x 10-3 8.8 x 10-4 
 
Step 2: Field related traffic vessels review  
Offshore related traffic vessels are to visit and serve the installation. Examples of offshore 
related traffic vessels are standby vessels, supply vessels, and working vessels. Table 2-4 
provides examples of the categories of colliding vessels.  
Table 2-4 – Categories of Colliding Vessels of Fielded Related Traffic (3) 
Traffic Category Vessel Category Remarks 
Offshore traffic 
Standby vessels Dedicated standby vessels 
Supply vessels Visiting supply vessels 
Working vessels 
Special services/ support such as 
diving vessels, pipelay, barges, 
intervention vessels, and crane barges 
 
Step 3: Damage level of ship collision 
Damage level of collision due to ship/vessel traffic is one of the factors to define level of 
individual risk of ship collision in term of impact frequency. These damage levels also help to 
quantify damage frequency of ship collision due to variations of use of vessels around platform 
area. Definition of each damage level is provided in Table 2-5. 
Table 2-5 – Damage Level of Ship Collision (3) 
Damage Level Definition 
Total loss 
Total loss of the unit including constructive total loss from an 
insurance point of view. However, the unit may be repaired 
and put into operation again. 
Severe damage Severe damage to one or more modules of the unit. 
Significant damage Significant/ serious damage to module and local area of the unit. 
Minor damage Minor damage to single essential equipment; damage to more none-essential equipment. 
Insignificant damage Insignificant or no damage; damage to part(s) or essential equipment. 
 
Step 4: Collision frequency 
The frequency of ship collision accidents can be determined by using the WOAD data taken 
from OGP Risk Assessment Ship/ Installation Collision Report No. 434-16. Example of accident 
statistics from OGP 434-16 are shown in Table 2-6. 
Table 2-6 – Ship Collision Accident Data for Risk Estimation Model (Example) (3) 
Ship Collision Accident Data Value 
Risk of collision per installation-year 8.8 x 10-4 per year 
Geographical variation of infield vessel 
collision frequencies 0.17 
 
Step 5: Probability of ship collision 
According to Ref. (3), the probability of collision by vessel types is presented in Table 2-7. For a 
TLP, the fraction of damage levels by vessel types are provided in Table 2-8. Working vessels 
and supply vessels pose a higher threat to offshore platforms than standby vessels.     
Table 2-7 – Probability of Collisions Events given Vessel Type (3) 
Vessel Type Value 
Supply vessel 0.34 
Standby vessel 0.19 
Working vessel 0.34 
Table 2-8 – Fraction of Collision Damage Levels by Vessel Type (3) 
Vessel Type 
Damage Level 
Total Loss Severe Significant Minor Insignificant 
Supply vessel 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
Standby vessel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Working vessel 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 
 
Step 6: Individual risk 
IRPA is the chance of an individual becoming a fatality. Ship collision individual risk is 
calculated as below based on the information given in Table 2-3 to Table 2-8.  
 
IRPA = Collision frequency (per year) ×  
Probability of collision events by vessel type × 
Probability of damage level by vessel type     
 
Step 7: Potential loss of life 
PLL is calculated to represent the individual risk for the aggregate platform operations personnel 
exposed to ship/marine collision. During normal operations, the number of personnel on board 
(POB) can be assumed with 100% platform occupancy for conservatism.    
            𝑃𝐿𝐿 = 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝐴 𝑥 𝑃𝑂𝐵 
 
2.2 Consequence Analysis 
The consequence of an accidental collision event can be assessed in terms of human fatalities / 
injuries, asset damage / failure, or environment / reputation / business impact.  For the safe 
design of offshore exploration and production facilities against accidental collisions, the 
structural integrity consequence is of interest. This section discusses the use of structural analysis 
for consequence aspect of accidental collisions.  
The structural consequence of an accidental collision to an offshore asset is predicted using 
either simplified approach (if applicable) or advanced finite element (FE) modeling. The FE 
approach is often used to remove the conservatism in the simplified approach. Advanced 
nonlinear dynamic structural analysis is capable of taking into account the effects of dynamic 
loading, geometric nonlinearity, material nonlinearities (strain rate effects, dynamic increase 
factor), and contact nonlinearity. Since collision loads are accidental loads, structural response of 
the targets is not expected to remain in the linear elastic range. Certain damage, i.e., material 
permanent plastic deformation, is allowed to absorb the impact energy.  Hence, advanced finite 
element analysis (FEA) is more applicable in the design against collision loadings. A general 
finite element package such as Abaqus (6) is suitable for this type of analysis and was used for 
all of the consequence analyses in this paper. If the targets can absorb the impact energy and 
damage caused by the impact is acceptable or tolerable (performance criteria), no action is 
required.  However, if the performance criteria are not met, either the targets have to be re-
designed or protection structures need to be provided.  
Geometry Modeling 
In FEA, impactors, i.e., dropped objects, ships, helicopters, are usually modeled as rigid bodies 
with the initial impact velocity. The corresponding impact energy is equal to one half of the 
impactor’s mass multiplied by the square of the impactor’s velocity. If the impact happens in 
water, other factors such as added mass have to be accounted for. The targets of the collision are 
often modeled as a deformable body with shell or solid elements. In this rigid impactor – 
deformable target set up, the impact energy is dissipated conservatively only through the plastic 
strains (unrecoverable deformation) of the impacted target.  
 
Figure 2-6: Example Abaqus FE Model: A Rigid DO Impacting a Deformable Deck 
Material Modeling 
Excessive deformation is expected during accidental collision event.  It is likely that structural 
components undergo large plastic deformation, even failure.  Hence material plasticity/failure 
must be modeled to capture these nonlinear effects. Since impact loading happens in very short 
duration of time, rate-dependent plasticity should be taken into account.  Figure 2-7 presents 
stress-strain relationships up to fracture for low-carbon mild steel at different strain rates (7). 
Yielding stress is also sensitive to strain rates, especially for high strength steels.  Increase in 
yield strength due to strain rate effects is characterized by a dynamic increase factor. In Figure 
2-8, the dynamic increase factor for yield strength versus strain rate is plotted for a mild steel 
(ASTM A36 steel with static yield stress of 250 MPa) and for a high strength, quenched and 
tempered steel (ASTM A514 steel with yield stress approximately 760 MPa). 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Effect of Strain Rates on Behavior of Mild Steel (7) 
 
Figure 2-8: Dynamic Increase Factor for Yield Strength of Mild and High Strength 
Steels versus Strain Rates (8) 
 
Performance Criteria 
















































yield point, i.e. unrecoverable damage, and eventually rupture. In the consequence analysis, 
material failure (i.e. rupture) can be assumed at 15% plastic strain for parent steel and 5% for 
connections (9). 
3. Case Studies 
3.1 Dropped Object Analysis  
The dropped object case study involved lifting operation during installation of a four-legged 
fixed jacket platform.  The water depth was 108.8 m. The lifting manifest including 14 lifted 
items is shown in Table 3-1. 
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Based on the method described in the methodology section, we used Monte Carlo simulations to 
estimate the impact probability due to each dropped object on the seabed. The results of the 
impact probability analysis for the dropped object “Waste bins” at seabed level are shown in 
Figure 3-1 as an example. The crane location is shown by a larger circle and the four jacket leg 
locations are denoted by four smaller circles. The probabilistic assessment was carried out for all 
14 dropped objects. The contours of impact frequency at seabed for the 14 different dropped 





Figure 3-1: Impact Frequency Contours on Seabed due to Waste Bins DO 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Contours of Impact Frequencies for Total of 14 DOs 
Consequence Analysis 
For an offshore platform, either fixed or floating, different types/scenarios of structural 
consequence analysis due to dropped objects could be done.  These may include dropped objects 
on topsides upper deck plate members, equipment, on sub-structure components such as jacket 
legs, risers, mooring lines, or on pipeline on the sea bed. The goal of a structural consequence 
analysis is to estimate the energy absorption capacity of the components within the acceptance 
criteria, i.e., acceptable damage level. As an example, Figure 3-3 presents the energy capacity as 
a function of deformation of a 26” flowline pipe with elasto-plastic seabed assumption.  In this 
simulation, the energy was dissipated through both pipe and soil plastic deformations. Figure 3-4 
shows the comparison of the results between FE analyses with different assumptions and 
simplified approach outlined in DNV-RP-F107. In the FE analyses, the seabed was modelled as 
rigid, elastic, or elasto-plastic. Two types of FE analyses were done: impact analysis and 
analytical analysis. The impact analysis simulated an impact event with possible “spring 
bouncing back” effect in which the deformable pipe acted as a spring.  In the analytical analysis, 
the dropped object was pushed down into the pipe until failure of the pipe occurred. The analysis 
results indicate that DNV approach could give smaller energy capacity than FE approach in 
which seabed assumed to be elasto-plastic (realistic assumption).  Since the capacity of the 
flowline is around 363 kJ (before rupturing) which is less than the impact energies of certain 
dropped objects as shown in Table 3-1, protection structure may be required if the risk is not 
acceptable or tolerable. 
 
 




Figure 3-4: Energy Capacity vs. Deformation of a 26” Flowline Pipe: FEA vs. Simplified 
Approach (DNV-RPF107) 
 
3.2 Helicopter Collision 
Following the discussion in the methodology section, this section presents an example of 
frequency and consequence analyses in the risk assessment of a helicopter collision event.  The 
same four-legged fixed jacket platform considered in the dropped object case study was 
considered here. For illustration purpose, Figure 3-5 shows a 3D model snapshot in which a 
helicopter is landing on the helideck of the fixed jacket platform. 
 
Figure 3-5: 3D Snapshot showing a scenario that a helicopter landing on the 
helideck of the fixed jacket platform 
 
Frequency Analysis 
The frequency analysis was done for two scenarios: (1) Helicopter crash during take-off, transit, 
and landing and (2) Helicopter impact on platform after falling off from helideck.  Table 3-2 
summarizes the information used in the analysis. 
Table 3-2 – Helicopter Flight Data  
Parameter Value 
Duration of round-trip flight between shore 
base and platform 80 minutes (1.33 hours) 
Offshore round trips per annum 104.35 per annum 
Number of take-off & landings 4 per round trip 
Average number of passengers per flight 14 per flight 
 
Helicopter Crash during Take-off, Transit, and Landing 
Statistical accident data were derived from OGP risk assessment data directory (2). The data, 
based on worldwide accidents in the period 1998 to 2006, was used in this example.  The flight 
time between the shore base and platform was approximately 40 minutes. The number of flights 
was assumed as approximately 104.35 platform visits per year. From the aforementioned 
information, the risk contributions were determined as follows: 
 
Total flight time per year =  
104.35 offshore flights/year × 1.33 hour/flight = 138.78 hours/year 
Total flight stages =  
104.35 offshore flights/year × 4 stages/flight = 417.4 stages/year 
In-flight risk =  
7.60×10-4 per year 
Take-off/ landing risk =  
1.32×10-4 per year 
IRPA =  
5.62×10-4 per year 
The annual PLL from helicopter transport for the installation can be calculated with the 
following additional information. The helicopter model was assumed the AW-139, which has a 
passenger capacity of 14.  
PLL = 5.62×10-4 × 14 = 7.87×10-3 per year 
 
The helicopter transport risk contributions are summarized in Table 3-3. 
 
Table 3-3 – Helicopter Transport Risk Contributions 
IRPA  5.62×10-4 
PLL per year 7.87×10-3 
 
Helicopter Impact at Platform after Falling off from Helideck 
The probability of a helicopter impact at the platform has been determined using the event tree 
shown in Figure 3-6. The conditional probability of helicopter falling off from the helideck and 
crashing on the platform was estimated to be 0.21× 0.67 × 0.20 = 0.028. 
 
Figure 3-6: Probability of Helicopter Impact at Platform 
The total accident rate per take-off/landing operations and the number of helicopter arrivals and 
passengers are based on data in Table 2-2 and Table 3-2. The risk contributions were therefore 
determined as follows, assuming a fatality probability of falling off helideck after a crash of 0.1.  
IRPA contribution = 7.89 × 10-7 per year 
PLL contribution = 1.10 × 10-5 per year 
Consequence Analysis 
Figure 3-7 shows a scenario that the helicopter impacts the helideck at an angle of 30 degrees.  
The impact speed was assumed to be 28 m/s. In this example, shell elements were used for the 
helideck pancake structure, and the helideck support structures were modeled with nonlinear 
beam elements. The helicopter was modeled as rigid body with shell elements such that the 
impact energy would be dissipated through the plastic strains of the helideck. The plastic 
contours in Figure 3-8 indicate that there were damages at the impact location including helideck 
pancake plank and beams. Rupture and failure in welding and connection regions were observed. 
However, overall stability of the helideck was maintained after the impact. 
 
Figure 3-7: FE Model for Helicopter Collision Scenario 
 
Figure 3-8: Plastic Strain Contours: Red color indicates 5% plastic strain 
3.3 Ship Impact  
Following the discussion in the methodology section, this section presents an example of 
frequency and consequence analyses in the risk assessment of a ship impact/collision event.  A 
TLP was considered in this case study. For illustration purpose, Figure 3-5 shows a 3D model 
snapshot in which a vessel is approaching to impact a column of the TLP. 
 
 
Figure 3-9: 3D Snapshot indicating a ship impacting a column of a TLP 
 
Frequency Analysis 
Statistical accident data were obtained from OGP risk assessment data directory (3). The data, 
based on worldwide accidents in the period 1990-2002, were used in this example. From the 
aforementioned information, the IRPA values were calculated and are shown in Table 3-4. The 
ship collision frequency was obtained from the number of collisions and exposures of the infield 
vessels to the installation. Risk contribution was not only from the collision frequency but also 
from the fraction of vessel and the fraction of damage level. Total IRPA ship collision frequency 
due to all related vessels to the floating unit TLP was calculated to be 1.30 ×10-4.  According to 
the UK HSE’s risk criteria (10), the boundary between the tolerable regions and broadly 
acceptable is 1.00x 10-3 – 1.00 x 10-6. IRPA of 1.30 x 10-4 is lower than the upper limit of the 
tolerable regions. It can be concluded that this IRPA due to ship collision is tolerable.   
Table 3-4 – Individual Risk Per Annum 
Vessel Type 
Damage Level 
Total Loss Severe Significant Minor Insignificant 
Supply vessel 0.0 0.0 2.54×10-5 2. 54×10-5 0.0 
Standby vessel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.84×10-5 
Working vessel 0.0 1.68×10-5 0.0 1.68×10-5 1.68×10-5 
The risk to personnel was estimated using PLL values. The PLL values according to ship 
collision by vessel types are provided in Table 3-5.  
 
Table 3-5 – PLL Ship Collision Risk Contributions per Year 
Vessel Type PLL per year 
Supply vessel 5.09×10-3 
Standby vessel 2.84×10-3 




In the following example, detailed nonlinear finite element analysis was used to understand the 
nature of potential ship impact consequence. The ship/vessel was used with a mass of 6,600 
tonnes and an impact velocity of 1.8 m/s for ship impacting TLP column. Figure 3-10 shows the 
FE model of a column impact scenario. In the FE model, the hull column was modeled using 
shell elements at impact zone. The column material was AH36 steel. 24mm outer column wall 
thickness was used. The horizontal and vertical girder sections (assumed welded to the outer 
column) were T600x16 and HP180x10. 13mm plate and HP180x10 section were used as a part 
of vertical stiffeners. Vessel including added mass was modeled as a rigid body and assumed 
with bow shape.  
The plastic strain contours are presented in Figure 3-11 which indicates that plastic strain 
reached 15% (permanent damage) on plating, girders, and stiffeners near the impact area due to 
the impact from the vessel. It can be concluded from this impact scenario that the vessel caused 
major damage to the plates, girders, stiffeners, and weld. Girders and stiffeners ruptured. The 
connections between the plates and the stiffeners failed. The weld connections between the 
girders, the stiffeners, and the outer column plates failed. This may lead to the leakage at the 
outer column plates due to the loss of plating material strength at the weld connections. The TLP 
hull may be flooded. The impact may interrupt the normal operation of the TLP platform. 
 
 
Figure 3-10: FE Model for Impacting TLP Column Scenario 
 









In offshore drilling operations, accidental loads such as dropped objects, helicopter collision, and 
ship impact, pose a high potential threat to human safety, asset integrity, environment as well as 
reputation and business of the operator. A safe design of offshore exploration and production 
facilities for accidental collisions requires the risk assessment of such accidental events. This 
paper proposes the methodology to assess such risk. For the frequency assessment part of the 
risk, the paper proposed extended versions of the approaches outlined in industry guidelines such 
as DNV-RP-F107.  For the consequence analysis, it has been demonstrated that advanced 
structural analysis is capable and suitable for understanding the response of structures to 
accidental loadings, not only to remove conservatism inherent in simplified approach but also to 
assure a safer and economical design. 
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